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My main focus, as requested by the editors, is the changing governance of welfare. 
But changes in this regard are inseparable from broader changes in the welfare 
regimes that emerged in advanced western capitalist states in the postwar Atlantic 
Fordist boom. Thus I will also discuss the social and economic functions that current 
welfare regimes are expected to perform and the scales on which these functions 
are undertaken. My analysis starts from the interest in more or less radical reform of 
postwar welfare states and relates this to the weakening of their governance 
structures as well as their policy effectiveness by the interaction of various economic, 
social, and political factors.  
 
The Keynesian Welfare National State  
 
A highly provocative claim in this regard comes from Claus Offe, who, writing as 
issues of crisis, crisis-management, and crisis resolution moved up the political 
agenda, argued that 'while capitalism cannot coexist with, neither can it exist without, 
the welfare state' (1984: 153, italics in original). My concluding comments suggest a 
solution to 'Offe's paradox'. But this first requires a new analysis of welfare regimes 
going beyond what Offe and his neo-marxist contemporaries, for all their acuity, 
could offer fifteen years ago, before the crises in and/or of welfare regimes had 
developed to the present extent (for a general critique of their position, see Klein 
1993). Thus, building on the French regulation approach to political economy and 
recent institutionalist work on governance, I discuss the role of welfare regimes in 
economic and social reproduction, the scales on which welfare is organized, and the 
forms deployed in governing them. 
An important step in clarifying Offe's paradox is to identify the form of welfare state 
said to be in crisis. This is the form that became dominant in North Western Europe, 
North America, Australia, and New Zealand during the 1950s to 1970s and that was 
closely linked with the Fordist growth dynamic. It can be described in ideal-typical 
terms as the Keynesian welfare national state (or KWNS). Each term in this fourfold 
construct highlights its distinctive features and ignores any generic properties the 
KWNS may share with other types of capitalist welfare regime. Thus, before 
presenting this ideal type, I justify the criteria used in constructing it and will thereby 
highlight some general features of capitalist economic and social reproduction. 
The four criteria derive from features of capitalism as a mode of production. The first 
criterion is the state's distinctive roles in securing conditions for profitable private 
business. This is the broad field of economic policy. It is important because market 
forces alone cannot secure these conditions and are supplemented by non-market 
mechanisms. This insufficiency is grounded in generic tendencies towards market 
failure and in specific contradictions and dilemmas associated with capitalism. The 
second dimension refers to the state's distinctive roles in reproducing labour power 
individually and collectively over various timespans from quotidian routines via 
individual lifecycles to intergenerational reproduction (on lifecycles, see Falkingham 
and Hills 1995). This is the broad field of social policy. It matters because labour 
power is a fictitious commodity (Polanyi 1944; Brunhoff 1968). For, although it is 
bought and sold in labour markets and may add value in production, it is not itself 
directly (re)produced in and by capitalist firms with a view to private profit. Labour 
power enters the market economy from outside and is embodied in individuals who 
have other identities than as bearers of labour-power. This poses economic 
problems as regards its individual and collective suitability to capital's needs and its 
own survival in the absence of a secure income or other assets; social problems 
regarding social inclusion and cohesion; and political problems regarding the 
legitimacy of state intervention in this area and its relation to other identities that 
workers may have. The third dimension refers to the main scale, if any, on which 
economic and social policies are decided – even if underpinned or implemented on 
other scales. This is important as economic and social policies are politically 
mediated and the scales of political organization may not coincide with those of 
economic and social life. The fourth dimension concerns the relative weight of the 
mechanisms deployed in the effort to maintain capitalist profitability and reproduce 
labour-power by compensating for market failures and inadequacies. This is where 
issues of governance are most relevant – although governance also enters into the 
other three dimensions. Top-down state intervention is just one of these 
mechanisms; and, as is well known, states as well as markets can fail. This suggests 
the need for other supplementary mechanisms and, insofar as these also tend to fail, 
for attention to the balance among them (Dunsire 1996; Bochel and Bochel 1998).  
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I now define the KWNS on these four dimensions. First, in promoting the conditions 
for capital's profitability, it can be described as distinctively Keynesian insofar as it 
aimed to secure full employment in a relatively closed national economy and to do so 
mainly through demand-side management. Second, in reproducing labour-power as 
a fictitious commodity, KWNS social policy had a distinctive welfare orientation 
insofar as it tried (a) to generalize norms of mass consumption beyond male workers 
in Fordist economic sectors earning a family wage so that national citizens and their 
dependants could all share the fruits of economic growth (and thereby also 
contribute to effective domestic demand); and (b) to promote forms of collective 
consumption favourable to the Fordist growth dynamic with its base in a virtuous 
national circle of mass production and mass consumption. Thus economic and social 
policies were linked to economic and social rights attached directly or indirectly to 
citizenship of a national territorial state – whether this citizenship was based on 
descent, acculturation, naturalization, political tests, or some other criterion (on types 
of national state, Jessop 1999a). Third, the KWNS was national insofar as economic 
and social policies were pursued within the historically specific (and socially 
constructed) matrix of a national economy, a national state, and a society seen as 
comprising national citizens. Within this matrix it was the national territorial state that 
was mainly held responsible for developing and guiding Keynesian welfare policies 
(de Swaan 1992). Local and regional states acted mainly as relays for policies 
framed at the national level; and the various international regimes established after 
WW2 were mainly intended to restore stability to national economies and national 
states. And, fourth, the KWNS was statist insofar as state institutions (on different 
levels) were the chief supplement to market forces in securing the conditions for 
economic growth and social cohesion. It was the combination of market and state on 
different levels that prompted the use of the term 'mixed economy' to describe the 
postwar system (classically, Shonfeld 1965). In addition to its role in facilitating and 
correcting the operation of market forces, the state also had a dominant role in 
shaping civil society and thus the identities held by its citizens.  
There was never a pure form of KWNS. At best one finds particular welfare regimes 
that combine the four features of the KWNS (in one or other of its variant forms) with 
other functions, scales of action, or modes of governance. Nor is there a pure crisis 
of the KWNS – only specific, path-dependent, nationally variable crises. In some 
cases there has been greater continuity, linked to the dominance of the view that 
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there was a crisis in the welfare state, with largely incremental shifts towards the new 
welfare regime (e.g., Denmark); in others there has been greater discontinuity – 
admittedly more marked in declared policy changes than actual policy outcomes – 
linked to a discursively-constructed crisis of the welfare state (e.g., Britain). 
 
The Importance of Governance 
 
For present purposes 'governance' refers to any form of coordination of 
interdependent social relations – ranging from simple dyadic interactions to complex 
social divisions of labour. Three main forms of coordination are usually distinguished: 
the anarchy of exchange (e.g., market forces), the hierarchy of command (e.g., 
imperative coordination by the state), and the 'heterarchy' of self-organization (e.g., 
networks). Along with other commentators I refer to the third form of coordination as 
'governance in the narrow sense' in contrast to the broader concept that also 
encompasses market forces and organizational hierarchies (on governance and 
governance failure, see Jessop 1998; also Kooiman 1993; Dunsire 1996). 
With the development of formally free labour markets, market forces became the 
chief mode of capitalist economic coordination. But the invisible hand, with its formal 
monetary maximands, impersonality (working, as Marx put it, behind the backs of the 
producers), procedural rationality, and post hoc operation, is supplemented through 
other modes of coordination that introduce more substantive objectives, elements of 
interpersonal or interorganizational deliberation, orientation to collective goals, and 
ex ante concertation. It is in this context that welfare regimes can help to secure 
some of the key conditions for capital accumulation. For they are implicated in 
governing the economic, gender, ethnic, intergenerational (and many other) aspects 
of the division of labour – and indeed themselves contribute to the 'labour of division', 
i.e., the classification and normalization of individuals, groups, and other social 
forces as a basis for differential treatment in the division of labour and for social 
inclusion-exclusion (on the labour of division, Munro 1997). The concept of 
governance is very useful in analyzing welfare regimes as it enables us to classify 
regimes in terms of their typical combinations of modes of coordination. The concept 
of the 'mixed economy of welfare' (Titmuss 1963; Pinker 1992) captures aspects of 
this; but, because it focuses on mechanisms of redistribution (occupational, fiscal, 
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welfare benefits), it neglects the ways that welfare regimes govern production and 
reproduction more generally.  
In this light one might consider three interrelated issues in the governance of welfare. 
These are the changing definitions of welfare; the changing institutions responsible 
for its delivery; and the practices in and through which welfare is delivered. These 
issues are closely linked. For it is a social scientific commonplace that governance 
practices (mediated by institutions) attempt to delimit, unify, stabilize and reproduce 
their objects of governance as the precondition as well as the effect of governing 
them. Moreover, as recent Foucauldian analyses have emphasized, governance 
practices also typically aim to create and reproduce the subjects needed for 
governance to operate effectively (Barry et al., 1996; Hunt and Wickham 1993). 
Thus, as the objects and modes of governance change, institutional mechanisms 
and actual practices change too – and so do the typical forms of governance failure. 
In this sense we should see welfare regimes as constitutive of their objects of 
governance and not just as responses to pre-given economic and social problems. 
Indeed this is one of the bases on which the welfare state is often criticized – that it 
generates the problems it addresses. This also suggests that it will be self-expanding 
– always finding new problems to solve – and, perhaps, ultimately self-defeating as it 
becomes more complex, overloads itself with tasks, and eventually produces a crisis 
of ungovernability (e.g., Crozier et al., 1975). 
Whether or not one subscribes to such criticisms, it was the purported failure of the 
KWNS as a mode of economic and social governance that prompted the search for 
new forms of governance. Its alleged crisis affected not only the modes of 
'governance-government-governing' in the KWNS but also its objects and subjects of 
social and economic governance. More specifically, the KWNS began to fail as a 
mode of governance when its coherence as an institutional ensemble became 
inconsistent with the objects it was governing, the practices being deployed to 
govern them, and the identities and interests of the active agents and/or 'passive' 
subjects of the KWNS regime. Thus, taking its four dimensions in turn, I would 
identify the following crisis-tendencies. 
First, the primary object of economic governance in the KWNS was the national 
economy. The emergence and consolidation of Keynesian practices had helped to 
delimit and reproduce the national economy (Tomlinson 1985). They provided the 
means of measuring national economic performance, controlling economic flows 
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across national borders, setting economic aggregates such as inflation, employment, 
and growth as goals of national economic management, and creating the 
infrastructure for national economic development. But Keynesian economic 
management became increasingly problematic and generated stagflationary 
tendencies (stagnation plus inflation) that fuelled the emerging crisis of the Atlantic 
Fordist economy that the KWNS was supposed to manage (Boyer 1991). Economic 
internationalization exacerbated these problems. It undermined the national 
economy as an object of economic management and led to quite different 
conceptions of the economy and, a fortiori, its mechanisms of economic and social 
governance. States could no longer act as if national economies were more or less 
closed and their growth dynamics were primarily domestic (Teeple 1995). Replacing 
the national economy as the primary object of economic governance is the 
knowledge-driven economy in an era of globalization (Castells 1996). Its growth 
dynamic depends on how effectively a given economic space – not necessarily a 
national economy – is inserted into the changing global division of labour. This in 
turn has prompted concern with international economic competitiveness and supply-
side intervention – initially to supplement national demand management, later as the 
primary objective and means of economic intervention. 
The imagined scope and inclusiveness of the economy that needs governing have 
also expanded. This is no longer interpreted in narrow terms but has been extended 
to include many additional factors, deemed 'non-economic' under the KWNS regime, 
that affect economic performance. This expansion is reflected in concepts such as 
'structural competitiveness' (Chesnais 1986) or 'systemic competitiveness' (Messner 
1997) – concepts that highlight the combined impact of diverse societal factors on 
competitiveness. State managers therefore intervene in a growing range of 
economically relevant practices, institutions, functional systems, and domains of the 
lifeworld to enhance competitiveness. This has two interesting and paradoxical 
effects on the state. First, whilst it expands the potential scope of state intervention 
for economic purposes, the resulting complexity renders postwar top-down 
intervention less effective – requiring that the state retreat from some areas of 
intervention and re-invent itself as a condition for more effective intervention in 
others (Messner 1997). And, second, whilst it increases the range of stakeholders 
whose cooperation is required for successful state intervention, it also increases 
pressures within the state to create new subjects to act as its partners. Thus states 
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are now trying to transform the identities, interests, capacities, rights, and 
responsibilities of economic and social forces so that they become more flexible, 
capable, and reliable agents of the state's new economic strategies – whether in 
partnership with the state and/or with each other or as autonomous entrepreneurial 
subjects in the new knowledge-driven economy (Barry et al., 1996; Deakin and 
Edwards 1993; Finer 1997; Jones 1999). 
Second, the generic object of social governance in the KWNS (as in other forms of 
national state) was a national population divided in the first instance into citizens of 
the national state and resident aliens. But this population was categorized and 
governed in distinctive ways suited to Atlantic Fordism and its mode of regulation. 
Above all, social policy was premised on conditions of full or near-full employment, 
lifelong employment – albeit not necessarily with the same employer – with a family 
wage for male workers, and the patriarchal nuclear family as the basic unit of civil 
society (Esping-Andersen 1994). The KWNS was also premised on a class 
compromise between organized labour and organized business in which responsible 
unionism and collective bargaining permitted managers to manage and workers to 
benefit from rising productivity as wage earners and welfare recipients. There were 
nonetheless some marginalized or overburdened social groups – most notably 
women as housewives, mothers, and secondary participants in the labour force and 
also immigrants or other workers (and their families) who worked in disadvantaged 
segments of the labour market (Lewis 1998). This pattern was undermined both 
economically and socially. The crisis of Atlantic Fordism undermined the 
assumptions of full employment, the family wage, and the gendered division of 
labour; and also led state managers to see the social wage increasingly as a cost of 
international production rather than as a source of domestic demand. The KWNS 
was also affected by a weakening of the national identity and solidarity that shaped it 
in its formative period and helped sustain the coalition behind it. This is reflected in 
changes in the values, social identities, and interests associated with the welfare 
state. Indicators of this included rejection of the social democratic and/or Atlantic 
Fordist commitment to a class-based redistributive politics; a pluralistic identity 
politics and 'politics of difference' that emphasizes mutual respect, authenticity, and 
autonomy; increased concern for personal empowerment rather than for the 
bureaucratic administration of legal rights, monetized entitlements, and uniform 
public services; and expansion of the so-called 'third' sector, which supposedly 
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operates flexibly outside of the framework of pure markets and the bureaucratic state 
(but often in close conjunction with them as a 'shadow market' and 'shadow state'). 
These shifts have fragmented the KWNS coalition of forces, led to demands for more 
differentiated and flexible forms of economic and social policy, and led to concern 
with problems of social exclusion and ensuring life-time access to the benefits of a 
restructured welfare regime (e.g., lifelong learning).  
Third, the primacy of the national scale of economic and social governance 
depended on the coincidence of national economy, national state, national society 
and the survival of the national state as a sovereign body. This structured coherence 
has also been weakened. The national economy has been undermined by 
internationalization, the growth of multi-tiered global city networks, the formation of 
triad economies (such as the European Union), and the re-emergence of regional 
and local economies in national states. This complex articulation of global-regional-
national-local economies is related to the 'hollowing out' of the national state as its 
powers are delegated upwards to supra-regional or international bodies, downwards 
to regional or local states, or outwards to relatively autonomous cross-national 
alliances among local metropolitan or regional states with complementary interests. 
There are also growing attempts to internationalize (or, at least, Europeanize) social 
policy. And, third, the unity of the nation-state has been weakened by the (admittedly 
uneven) growth of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies and of divided political 
loyalties (with the resurgence of regionalism and nationalism as the rise of European 
identities, diasporic networks, cosmopolitan patriotism, etc.) (Jessop 1999a). Thus 
we see a proliferation of scales on which economic and social policy are pursued as 
well as competing projects to re-unify inter-scalar articulation around a new primary 
level – whether this be the industrial district, the city-region, wider sub-national 
regions, cross-border regions, the triads, or the global level. 
Finally, the state's role in the mixed economy was undermined by several factors. 
These include: growing political resistance to taxation and the emerging stagnation-
inflation; crisis in postwar compromises between industrial capital and organized 
labour; new economic and social conditions and attendant problems that cannot be 
managed or resolved readily, if at all, through continuing reliance on top-down state 
planning and/or simple market forces; growing resentment about the bureaucratism, 
inflexibility, and cost of the welfare state as it continued to expand during the late 
1960s and 1970s; and the rise of new social movements which did not fit easily into 
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the postwar compromise. Moreover, as society has become more complex and as 
new economic and social conditions emerge that cannot be managed or resolved 
readily, if at all, through the market and state as modes of governance, there has 
been increasing reliance on networks and partnerships as modes of coordination. 
Organizationally the Fordist period was one of large scale, top-down hierarchical 
structures and this model spread to the state's economic and welfare roles. This 
paradigm is being challenged by a new 'network paradigm' that emphasizes 
partnership, regulated self-regulation, the informal sector, the facilitation of self-
organization, and decentralized context-steering (Messner 1997). Overall this 
involves a tendential shift from imperative coordination by the sovereign state to an 
emphasis on interdependence, divisions of knowledge, reflexive negotiation, and 
mutual learning. In short, there is a shift from government to governance in the 
narrow sense. 
 
The Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime 
 
These changes are reflected in four general trends in the restructuring of the KWNS. 
The first is a shift from Keynesian aims and modes of intervention to Schumpeterian 
ones; the second is a shift from a welfarist mode of reproduction of labour-power to a 
workfarist mode; the third is a shift from the primacy of the national scale to a post-
national framework in which no scale is predominant; the fourth is a shift from the 
primacy of the state in compensating for market failures to an emphasis on 
networked, partnership-based economic, political, and social governance 
mechanisms. These trends can be considered separately. Indeed, both severally 
and in combination, they have developed in quite different ways in the various 
Atlantic Fordist economies. They can nonetheless be summarized in terms of the 
suggestion that the Keynesian welfare national state (KWNS) is giving way to a 
Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime (SWPR). Moreover, whether viewed 
individually or in aggregate, these four changes are closely connected to the search 
for solutions to the Atlantic Fordist crisis.  
The ideal-typical SWPR can be described as follows. First, regarding its functions for 
capital, it is Schumpeterian insofar as it tries to promote permanent innovation and 
flexibility in relatively open economies by intervening on the supply-side and to 
strengthen as far as possible their structural and/or systemic competitiveness. 
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Complementing these new strategic concerns in economic and social policy has 
been the demotion or rejection of other, earlier policy objectives. Whilst the KWNS 
aimed to secure full employment, the SWPR demotes this aim in favour of promoting 
structural or systemic competitiveness. Second, regarding social reproduction, the 
SWPR can be described (at the risk of misunderstanding) as a workfare regime 
insofar as it subordinates social policy to the demands of labour market flexibility and 
employability and to the demands of structural or systemic competitiveness. Thus, 
whilst the KWNS tried to extend the social rights of its citizens, the SWPR is 
concerned to provide welfare services that benefit business and thereby demote 
individual needs to second place. This includes putting downward pressure on the 
social wage qua cost of international production. Concern with training and labour 
market functioning has long been a feature of state involvement in the social 
reproduction of labour-power, of course, but the SWPR gives greater weight to 
flexibility and endows it with new connotations (Ainley 1997). It is for these reasons 
that there is also a major reorientation on the part of the state to the making and re-
making of the subjects who are expected to serve as partners in the innovative, 
knowledge-driven, entrepreneurial, flexible economy and its accompanying self-
reliant, autonomous, empowered workfare regime (for a recent illustration, Blair and 
Schröder 1999).  
Third, compared with the earlier primacy of the national scale, the SWPR is 
'postnational' insofar as the increased significance of other spatial scales and 
horizons of action (or 'relativization of scale')1 makes the national territory less 
important as a 'power container'. This is associated with a transfer of economic and 
social policy-making functions upwards, downwards, and sideways. International 
agencies (such as the IMF, World Bank, OECD, and ILO) play an increased role in 
shaping the social as well as economic policy agendas; in Europe, moreover, the 
European Union also has a growing role (cf. de Swaan 1992; Deacon 1995; 
Leibfried, 1993; Wilding 1997). But there is a simultaneous devolution of some 
economic and social policy-making to the regional, urban, and local levels on the 
grounds that policies intended to influence the micro-economic supply-side and 
social regeneration are best designed close to their sites of implementation. In some 
cases this also involves cross-border cooperation among regional, urban, or local 
spaces. In all three regards welfare governance has become more postnational. Yet, 
paradoxically, this leads to an enhanced role for national states in controlling the 
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interscalar transfer of these powers – suggesting a shift from sovereignty to a primus 
inter pares role in intergovernmental relations.  
Finally, regarding the mode of delivery of economic and social policies, the SWPR 
has a regime form because of the increased importance of non-state mechanisms in 
compensating for market failures and inadequacies and in the delivery of state-
sponsored economic and social policies. This provides a second important aspect to 
the apparent (but deceptive) 'hollowing out' of national states, namely, the increased 
importance of private-public networks to state activities on all levels – from local 
partnerships to supranational neo-corporatist arrangements (e.g., Clarke and Gaile 
1998; Falkner 1998). 
Like all ideal-types, the SWPR has been formed through the one-sided accentuation 
of empirically observable features (in this case, in Atlantic Fordist societies) to 
construct a logically possible social phenomenon. This does not presuppose actual 
examples of the SWPR in pure form nor imply that any movement along its different 
dimensions occurs evenly and at the same pace. Indeed there is significant variation 
in the search for solutions to the alleged problems of the KWNS. It involves neither a 




This article has presented an ideal-typical contrast between two forms of welfare 
regime – the Keynesian Welfare National State and the Schumpeterian Workfare 
Postnational Regime. My other work on these two forms deals mainly with their 
economic and social functions in reproducing private capital and labour-power. This 
article addresses the governance of welfare regimes and the changing scales on 
which such governance occurs. It has argued that the national mixed economy of 
welfare (based on a combination of market and plan) is giving way to a new 
postnational mixed economy in which networks and partnership have become more 
important. I have also argued that the subjects as well as the objects of governance 
are being reconstituted. Since this involves far more than a simple technical fix, it is 
easy to see why the transition from KWNS to SWPR is always politically mediated 
and often difficult. Thus, although my entry point for analyzing the transition is 
inspired by Marxist political economy, a critique of politics is also required. This 
would serve not only to interpret the political mediations of the transition (as well as 
 11
any 'conservation-dissolution' effects)2 but also the constitutive role of politics in 
defining the problems to which the transition is a response and redefining both the 
objects and subjects of governance. This in turn helps to explain why, despite a 
tendential de-nationalization of the state and a shift from government to governance, 
national states still have major roles in shaping how the economic and social 
reproduction requirements of capital are met. For they try to determine which 
functions go upwards, downwards, and sideways and the conditions on which they 
stay there; and also seek both to design governance mechanisms and to politically 
organize self-organization.  
Space limitations prevented me from identifying sub-types of KWNS and SWPR and 
from assessing how far the posited changes have occurred in particular cases. But, 
just as there were different forms of governance in the KWNS, so the SWPR also 
has variant forms (neo-liberal, neo-corporatist, neo-statist, and, as a supplement, 
neo-communitarian) (but see Jessop 1993, 1994, 1999b). While there are economic, 
political, and intellectual forces that are closely identified with one or other mode of 
governance, these sub-types are best seen as poles around which different national 
solutions have developed (and are developing) during more or less extended periods 
of conflict and experimentation. Currently the neo-liberal form of SWPR is 
hegemonic on the international level but important counter-currents exist in specific 
national and regional contexts. Each sub-type and each welfare-workfare mix has 
different implications for welfare policy. The particular mix in individual cases will 
depend on institutional legacies, the balance of political forces, and the changing 
economic and political conjunctures in which different strategies are pursued. They 
will also be overdetermined by factors beyond those included within this particular 
approach to the political economy of welfare. There is certainly no reason to expect a 
multilateral convergence of welfare regimes around one sub-type of the SWPR – let 
alone a rapid convergence. 
Finally, I want to suggest a solution to 'Offe's paradox'. On the one hand, capitalism 
(in its Atlantic Fordist form) did co-exist with the welfare state (in its KWNS form) for 
an extended period. Eventually the Fordist growth regime and its KWNS mode of 
regulation became mutually contradictory. This prompted a search for new economic 
and social bases for capital accumulation; and this involved a partial dismantling of 
the KWNS. In this sense the emerging post-Fordist capitalist regime cannot co-exist 
with the KWNS. But this search extends to new forms of state (or, alternatively, 
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extra-economic) intervention that might help to re-secure conditions for private 
profitability and the reproduction of labour-power. One could perhaps label this a 
simple restructuring of the welfare state but emphasizing policy continuities in this 
way actually hides as much (if not more) than it reveals (the problem in, for example, 
Klein's critique, 1993). For the core organizational principles of the KWNS are being 
superseded in favour of those of the SWPR as a condition for the renewed co-
existence of capitalism and the welfare state. Nonetheless this has several possible 
forms and should not be reduced to the neo-liberal workfare state favoured by 






1   On the 'relativization of scale', see Collinge (1996). 
2   These effects occur when certain features of an earlier system are retained but 
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